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ANDMACRO—ECONOMIC FLUCTUATIONS
Traditional neoclassical theory has one clear, unambiguous, and verif i—
able prediction:all factors which have a positive price are fully utilized. In
recent years, there have been several responses to the apparent inconsistency
between the predictions of neoclassical theory and what has In fact been observed.
The first is to deny the empirical observations:the 25% of the population that
wereunemployed in the Great Depression, let alone the 10% of the population that
wereunemployedin the Reagan Recession were not involuntarily unemployed.This
seemsto us, at best, semantic quibbling, and we shall have nothing further to say
here concerning that view.The second is to argue, without much justification,
that there are two regimes; traditional neoclassical theory applies in "normal
tiuies."It seems more plausible to us that the market failures represented by the
Great Depression are always present in the economy, but difficult to detect; it is
onlywhen they reach the proportions that they do periodically that wecan no
longer ignore them.
A third approach is to modify the standard theory, to assume that wages
and prices are fixed.This approach has rightfully been criticized both for its
ad hocery and its inconsistency——why should rational profit maximizing firms,
obeying all of the other neoclassical assumptions, not cut their prices in the
face of excess demand.
This paper is part of an attempt to develop a consistent set of micro—
foundations for macro—economics, based on imperfect information.We focus here on
the capital market.Keynes argued that the sharp drop in investment and the
failure of the interest rate to fall sufficiently to restore investment to a
normal level was a central part of the description of any business cycle.Keynes'
analysis of investment was, however, basically a neoclassical analysis:it was
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the capital market. Keynes argued that the sharp drop in investment and the
failure of the interest rate to fall sufficiently to restore investment to a
normal level was a central part of the description of any business cycle. Keynes'
analysis of investment was, however, basically a neoclassical analysis: it was—2—
thefailure of the real interest rate (the long—term bond rate) to fall suffi-
ciently that was the source of the problem.
Three aspects of this analysis have always been troubling:first,
Keynes' explanation of the failure of real interest rates to fall, the liquidity
trap, is not persuasive.Second, surveys suggest that firms' investment behavior
is not particularly sensitive to the interest rate that they pay.Third, it has
always seemed difficult to account for the magnitude of the fluctuations in
investment in terms of the observed magnitudes of variations in real interest
rates, outputs, wages, and prices, unless firms are very risk averse; and it Is
hard to reconcile high degrees of risk aversion on the part of firms with
well—functioning (neoclassical) capital markets.
This paper is based on the hypothesis that Keynes' judgment concerning
that the importance of fluctuations in investment is correct, but that he Incor-
rectly analyzed the determinants of investment behavior.We argue that:
1.Many firms face credit constraints; thus it is the availability of
credit, not the price which they have to pay, which restricts their investment, or
when it is working capital which is curtailed, which limits their production.
2.Firms that are not credit constrained may still face an increase in
the effective cost of capital, which induces them to reduce their investment.
(The increase in the effective cost of capital has further effects, e.g., on the
pricing decisions of firms.)
I.The Debt Market
The main informational problem facing banks is that they do not know how
the money they lend is being invested.Stiglitz—Weiss (1981,1983) showed that an
increase in the interest rate charged borrowers will, in general, increase the
average riskiness of the projects a bank is financing.This is either because
borrowers switch to riskier projects or because safer projects become relatively
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I. The Debt Market
The main informational problem facing banks is that they do not know how
the money they lend is being invested. Stiglitz—Weiss (1981,1983) showed that an
increase in the interest rate charged borrowers will, in general, increase the
average riskiness of the projects a bank is financing. This is either because
borrowers switch to riskier projects or because safer projects become relatively—3—
less attractive and so investors with safe projects do not apply for loans.The
effect on the riskiness of loans may outweigh the direct gain to the bank from
increasing its interest rate.Thus, the bank's profit may be maximized at an
interest rate at which there is an excess demand for loanable funds.
This kind of phenomenon (an interior price maximum and rationing, which
may also occur in the labor market) helps to explain business cycles in three
ways.First, and most obviously, it provides a rationale for the persistence of
non—market—clearing.Second, it may account for variations in a firm's cost of
capital which are unrelated to observed variations in interest rates.The likeli-
hood and severity of credit rationing may well increase in a recession without
necessarily any concurrent change in interest rates.An increase in credit
rationing might be expected both because of greater uncertainty concerning the
prospects of firms and an increase in the dead—weight loss associated with bank-
ruptcy.Third, information—based rationing models can explain how stabilization
policy is likely to work.For example, monetary policies which seek to increase
investment by lowering interest rates will not have the desired effect:there is
no shortage of willing borrowers.However, policies that Increase the avail-
ability of loanable funds will increase investment, even though theymay not
affect the level of interest rates at all.
There are two objections to our credit rationing theoryasan explana-
tion of the cyclical fluctuations in investment.First, why don't firms that face
credit constraints from banks attempt to raise capital by some othermeans, in
particular, by issuing new equity.And second, many firms that do not appear to
be credit constrained also seem to reduce their investment dramatically.
Thus, a necessary complement to the theory of credit rationing isa
theoryofinformational imperfections in equity markets.This we present In the
next two sections.
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II.EquityMarkets
A firm's ability to raise equity capital islimited by informational
imperfections fortwo basic reasons.First, incentive problems may intensify when
a firm isequity financed.Managers, who receive only a small fraction of any
additionalprofit, are likely to put forth less—than—optimal amountsof effort.
Imposing large bankruptcy costs on managers may act as a spur toadded effort and
the value of these incentives is reduced byadditional equity finance.Debt
financing also allows managers less flexibility indisposing of net income than
equity doesThus, equity funds may reduce the value of a firm by allowing more
"profit" to be diverted to the private uses of the firm's managers.Finally,
lenders have the power to discipline tnanagers by withdrawingtheir funds.This is
a sanction which can be imposedpiecemeal and may, therefore, be more effective
than share voting to which majority ruleapplies.1
Second, signalling effects may restrict a firm's access to equity
markets.Managers of firms, which they know to be"good," may be willing to
assume greater debt burdens.Both the absolute level of bankruptcy risk and any
incremental increase due to added debt will be smaller for"good" than for "bad"
firms.Greater reliance ondebt by "good" firms means that equity will predomi-
nantly besold by inferior ones (see Ross (1977)).Thus, attempting to sell
equity may convey a strong negative signal about afirm's qualityand reduce its
marketvalue accordingly.
The model presented in this paper analyzes the cyclical costof capital
implications of the signalling process just described as anexample of the macro-
economic impact of the many limitations on equity issue which arenoted above.It
provides an explanation for large, but not directly observable,variations in the
marginal cost of capital (to be distinguished from the average costof capital
measured for example by Tobin's q) which can account for many of thevariations in
investment which are commonly associated with business cycles.The negative
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signal associated with issuing equity means that the cost of equity is prohibitive
for many firms.Thus, the effective marginal cost of capital is the marginal cost
of debt which consists of the monetary cost of interest plus the marginal increase
in expected bankruptcy cost associated with additional debt.The latter bankruptcy
cost will increase as a firm faces unexpectedly adverse economic conditions and
may do so dramatically.Moreover, it is likely that the adverse signal associated
with issuing equity will intensify and place equity finance even further out of
reach in just these circumstances.
III.A Simple Model
In this section, we construct a simple model which enablesus explicitly
to determine which investors will make use of the equity market and which of the
debt market, and which enables us to calculate the effective marginalcost of
capital.Because we wish to focus on the equity market, we assume bankerscan
perfectlydiscriminate among borrowers —indeed,the function of banks is to
differentiatepotential borrowers into their appropriate risk classes—butthat
the equity market treats all those seeking equity thesame.(Thus, while
Stiglitz—Weiss (1981) were concerned with imperfect information in the credit
market, we are concerned here with imperfect information in the equity market.In
a sequel, we investigate a more general model incorporating both.)We make the
following assumptions:
(Al) Each firm is characterized by a net cash flow,8,fromexisting operations
and a set of new investment opportunities whose return is £Q(K), where Cisa
r.v., E(C) =1,Var(C) = andK is the level of investment.2For exposi—
tional reasons, although firms are assumed to have different levels ofO,Q(')
is assumed to be the same for all firms.The parameter 0 describes the
"quality"or "value" of a particular firmandhas a distribution N(e) across
3 firms.
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At the beginning of the period firms announce their equity sales in—
tentions and V, each firm's market value, adjusts accordingly.Firms then sell
(or do not sell) equity, determine the level investment and finance any uncovered
balance with debt.At the end of the period, the results of new investment are
determined, some firms go bankrupt, and the values of6 are revealed for the
remaining firms.The terminal value of each firms equity is determined based on
its observed value of 0.Managers' compensation depends on current market value
and the share of terminal market value held by original shareholders, if the firm
does not go bankrupt.In the event of bankruptcy managers bear a known fixed
cost.





R Expected return on debt,
cECostwhich "bankruptcy" imposes on a firm's illanagers,
Probability of "bankruptcy,"
mEFactordescribing the weight that firmsplaceon their
initial as opposed to their terminal market value.
(A2) "Bankruptcy" occurs if,
e+ eQ(K)<(1+R)b, (2)
where R EContractualrate of interest on a firm's debt
° >R.
(A3) Lenders are fully informed, risk neutral and require an expected returnR,
(1+R)=(l+R)(l_PB)+fo01dF(c), (3)
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where =[(1+R0)b—eJ/Q(K) the value of e below which "bankruptcy"
occurs.
(A4)Equity investors are risk neutral and require an expected return R.They
observe only the level of a firm's equity sales in determining V0.Firms
selling equity sell a couunon dollar amount e.
The information structure of the model may appear restrictive, but in
fact is quite general.Allowing equity investors to observe only the level of
equity sales is a matter of interpreting the model as applying to a set of firms
whose other observable characteristics are identical.The analysis need only be
replicated for each such class of firms to cover the full firm population.4'5
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EInitialvalue of firms selling no equity,
EOptimallevelof investment for a non—equity selling
firm ofquality 0 (the 0 argument has been supressed),
Levelof bankruptcy risk implied by the optimal
investmentdecisions of a non—equity issuing
firm (again the 0 argumenthas been suppressed),
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0
VE,KEand P are defined analogously tovD,KDand P.Assuming that clies in
thelover tail of a single peakeddistribution, it is relatively straightforward
to show that dH(0)/dO >0.Thus, the optimal decision rule for individual firms
on equity sales policy is the following,
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where 0is defined by H(O) =0.Given equation (4) firms entering the equity
market will be adversely selected.And, although in this simple model an equilib-
rium always exists, it may be one with zero equity sales.However, if 0 >0for
all firms and m is close to zero, then an equilibrium with positive equity sales
will exist.In such an equilibrium, is determined by the equation,
=i_ JO(O+Q(K)-(KE_e))N(O)dO -e,
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has the following properties under suitable regularity conditions on F,
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In each instance an increase in is associated with an increase in the
number of firms issuing equity (a decrease in is associated with a
decrease in the number of firms issuing equity).
Also, if N(O) is normal with variance ci, then,
dVE/dcl<







where,fis the level of the e density function atEP,whereis the level of
the e for a non—equity issuing firm at which, when K is optimally chosen the firm
defaults(eDdepends, of course, on E.The second bracketed term on the right—
hand side of (5) represents the component of the cost of capital attributable to
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the marginal increase in the risk of bankruptcy.As 0 falls (because a negative
demand shock reduces the value of existing cash flows), this term may rise dramat—
D D 7 ically as f, andB increase.
Anysuch increase is limited ultimately by the possibility of issuing

















whereVD(e)=((0+Q(K))/(1+R)—KD)which is the market value of a firm of
quality 0, whose level of investment is optimal for debt finance (given 6),
assuming that 0 were observable.vE(o)isdefined analogously with replacing
KD.The left—hand side of equation (6) represents the differential benefits of
equity finance per dollar of equity.This consists of the reduced level of
bankruptcy risk and the benefits of an increased level of investment (i.e.,
vE(o)—VD(O)).The right—hand side of equation (6) captures the differential
cost of issuing equity. It consists of a signalling cost (the first term on the
right—hand side of (6)), embodying the difference in the value of a firm which
results from issuing equity (divided by the amount of equity issued), plus a
dilution cost (the second term on the right—hand side of (6)) which arises because
a firm with a true valueVE(O)must sell equity as if it had a value
In practice, the "effective" cost of issuing equity may be so high as to
beprohibitive.Event studies (most recently Asquith and Mullins (1983)) indicate
that an equity issue announcement reduces the value of a firm by about 3 percent.
And this may be a substantial underestimate since itis based on firms who
actually issue equity and who are, as a result, likely to have the lowest cost of
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doingso.Thus, if m4
anda new equity issue amounts to 5 percent of a firm's
outstanding stock, the signalling cost of equity will, by itself, amount to more
than 30 percent.It is not surprising, therefore, that firms rarely issue equity.
Moreover, if strong firms enjoy an enhanced advantage over weak ones in the face
of adverse economic conditions, a negative economic surprise will increase the




Informational imperfections have a fundamental effect on the functioning
of the capital market.In some circumstances, competitive markets will be charac-
terized by credit rationing:it is the availability of capital and not its cost
that determines the level of investment.Here, we have provided an explanation
for why firms whose credit is constrained do not avail themselves of the equity
market.And we have shown that the effective marginal cost of capital for those
who are not constrained is not simply related either to the real long—term
interest rate (as Keynes' hypothesized) or to the price of equity (as more recent
portfolio theories have argued); the effective marginal cost of capital may
experience much larger cyclical fluctuations than either of these variables.
These variations in the effective cost of capital. in turn play an important role
in explaining observed patterns of cyclical behavior regarding both investment and
prices.
Although the former effect is obvious, the latter may not be.When
current prices affect not only present but future demand (see Phelps and Winter
(1970)), firms will maximize profits with a price at which short—run marginal
costs lie above short—run marginal r'evenues.The gap is filled by the contribu—
tion of lower prices to future profits.Under these circumstances, an increase in
the cost of capital reduces the present value of any future market position and
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of adverse economic conditions, a negative economic surprise will increase the




Informational imperfections have a fundamental effect on the functioning
of the capital market. In some circumstances, competitive markets will be charac-
terized by credit rationing: it is the availability of capital and not its cost
that determines the level of investment. Here, we have provided an explanation
for why firms whose credit is constrained do not avail themselves of the equity
market. And we have shown that the effective marginal cost of capital for those
who are not constrained is not simply related either to the real long—term
interest rate (as Keynes' hypothesized) or to the price of equity (as more recent
portfolio theories have argued); the effective marginal cost of capital may
experience much larger cyclical fluctuations than either of these variables.
These variations in the effective cost of capital in turn play an important role
in explaining observed patterns of cyclical behavior regarding both investment and
prices.
Although the former effect is obvious, the latter may not be. When
current prices affect not only present but future demand (see Phelps and Winter
(1970)), firms will maximize profits with a price at which short—run marginal
costs lie above short—run marginal r'evenues. The gap is filled by the contribu-
tion of lower prices to future profits. Under these circumstances, an increase in
the cost of capital reduces the present value of any future market position and— 11—
willlead to an increase in current prices.Our cost of capital view leads to
just such a conclusion; as a recession begins, this tendency toward higher prices
might well counteract the effect of falling demand and account for some price
stickiness.In this and other ways informational imperfections may provide a
consistent economic explanation for many hitherto unexplained aspects of macro—
economic behavior.
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FOOTNOTES
1.There are well—knowii impediments, both theoretical and practical, to share-
holder control whether mediated via takeovers or normal corporate governance.
2.For simplicity, existing net cash flows are assumed to be certain.Making
existing cash flows uncertain would merely complicate the analysis and
reinforce the basic results.
3.The model, as presented, involves only a single period but can be easily
extended to a sequence of periods with independent 0 draws in each period.
4.The restriction to discrete levels of equity sales, though made primarily for
expositional convenience, has certain important theoretical justifications
and consequences.
5.In order that each class include firms with more than a single value o0
neither K nor b may be perfectly observable to equity investors.However,
given current accounting conventions and the timing of debt reports this is
not implausible.
6.A similar condition would apply for equity issuing fir*s because they are
limited to issuing only e0 dollars of equity.This is an artifact of our
assumptions.
0
7. J 0 declines, the term (1—( )(1_K(1+R))) decreases, partially offsetting
the impact on the marginal cost of capital of the factors cited above.
However, this effectis in large measure an artifact of the simple way In
which uncertainty is embodied in the model.If c affects both 6 and Q(k),
then the corresponding term in the resulting expression for the marginal cost
of capital tends to increase as 0 declines.
8.The dilution cost also rises under these circumstances as falls relative
to V0(0).And,asV falls, thecost of raising e0 dollars of equity
etnbodiedin the factor(V)/(V+e0) rises.
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